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Theseus in Eur. Hipp. 1257-60 says that when he heard how the curse he
pronounced on his son had been fulfilled he rejoiced at the news through
hatred (^iiaei) of Hippolytus; but out of respect for the filial relationship
which is of concern to the gods he is "neither gladdened^ nor grieved" by
what has happened. When Artemis has disclosed the truth of the matter, he
abases himself in utter remorse (1325 6Xoi|it|v). Artemis heaps excoriating
reproaches on his intemperate failure to test the truth of Phaedra's false
accusation, but grants him forgiveness for that (1326 ex' eoxl Kai ooi
T©v8e av)YYV(b)4.T|(; tdxeiv) because the whole train of disaster was the
work of Aphrodite in her pursuit of her vendetta against Hippolytus.
Consoling Hippolytus, Artemis tells him (1435) "I advise you not to hate
your father (natepa ^.ti atuYevv)." Theseus has destroyed him cxkcov, i.e.
under a misapprehension which acted as a constraint; it is only to be
expected that mortals will go wrong when they are caught up in a train of
god-given events; and it was Hippolytus's ^oipa to die as he is now dying.
Artemis has no intention of forgiving Aphrodite (a goddess, after all, could
not claim to have acted in ignorance of the facts), and she proclaims (1420-
22) that she will kill "whatever mortal is dearest to Aphrodite"; the
innocence of that next victim does not worry her, any more than Phaedra's
innocence worried Aphrodite.
According to the story told in Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 38-40, the king of
Armenia, father of Tigranes, executed a man who in his view was corrupting
(6ia(p0eipEiv) his son. Tigranes had greatly admired this man as koKoq,
KdYa06<;, and tells Cyrus, "When he was going to his execution, he said to
me, 'Do not be angry with your father (^t| xi at) . . . xaXeTiavGfiq xw
7iaxp{) simply because he has condemned me to death. He does this not
from ill-will (KaKovova) but from ignorance (ctyvoia), and all the wrong
that people do from ignorance I regard as action under constraint
^ By OV0' iiSojiai ktX., coming so soon after noGriv, he must mean that conventional
aiScoq is strong enough to pull him away from fi5ovf|, in the direction of Xvnri, to a half-
way point, but not beyond that. tjoGTiv normally describes the speaker's reaction at the
time of utterance (e.g. Ar. Nu. 174, 1240), but vvv 6' requires the audience to re-interpret
it as a true past tense.
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(dcKOiioia).'" Cyrus is impressed by so noble a sentiment. The king
excuses himself by admitting that he resented ((pGoveiv) his son's mentor,
believing that the man was usurping the respect (0ai)^d^eiv) which a son
owes to his father. Cyrus concedes that the king's fault was only human
(dvGpcoTiivd ^oi SoKEiq dp.apTdvEiv), and, turning to Tigranes, he
commands him, "Forgive your father (cuyyiYvoxyKE x<a naxpi)."
Consideration of the similarities and differences between these two
passages affords a good basis for comparison of Greek and modem attitudes
to forgiveness.
The most obvious difference between the passages is one of vocabulary.
If learners of Greek who have approached Uie subject through Classical
literature are asked, "What is the Greek for 'forgive'?" they are likely to say,
"o-oYYiYvcboKco." A student of the New Testament could hardly fail to say,
"dcpCimi," having in mind such famous texts as Lk 23. 34, "Father, forgive
them . . ." (dcpeq avxoic, ktX.). 'Acpievai is, of course, attested in that
sense from the fifth century onwards (e.g. Ar. Nu. 1425 f.), and is used in
Attic law of a victim who, before dying, absolves his killer (Dem. 37. 59).
The converse is not true, for avyyiYvtoaKeiv and avYyvwiiTi are not at all
favoured in Christian Greek. Unlike "forgive" and its equivalents in modem
European languages, ovYYiyvcoaKeiv declares itself by its composition a
verb of cognition. That much is clear from its usage by Herodotus and
Thucydides in other senses, "concur" in general (i.e. "share someone else's
opinion") and "admit" in particular (i.e. "share with one's accuser the same
assessment of one's own action"). The locus classicus is Thuc. 2. 60. 4,
"You blame me, who advised you to fight, and yourselves, oi ^weYvone."
The sense "forgive" arises from a recognition that people very commonly
regard their own actions as justified or at least, even if they feel some shame
and regret, as not deserving punishment. IvyyvtoGi }j.oi is an appeal for
empathy, "Share my view of the matter." That is not something which
Christians oppressed by a sense of their own unworthiness would demand of
God, but there is no theological reason why it should not be demanded of
the Olympian gods. Justin Dial. 9. 1 a\)yyvcb|iTi aoi . . . Kal dcpeGeiri aoi
combines a personal statement with a prayer; but the Lord's Prayer (Mt 6.
12 d(p£(; ...©<; Kal fiiieiq d(pTiKa^ev) and Mt 18. 21 d^iaptriaei zic, e^ie
. . .
Kttl d(pTioco at)tw show that humans too can dcpievai offences
against themselves. The connotations of a word do not necessarily persist
through its compounds, and it would be perilous to found an argument on
an insistence that they do, but in the case of avyYiyvcbaKeiv the other
compounds of YiyvcooKEiv and the first hundred words beginning with
a\)v- picked at random from the lexicon favour the argument from
etymology.
The striking fact about a^)YYi-YvcoaK:Eiv and ovyy\ai^r\ is that the
former is not auested before Simonides {PMG) 542. 27 (Danae apologises
to Zeus for venturing to voice the hope that her fortunes will change), and
the latter not until Herodotus. Until Simonides, Greek of the archaic period
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seems to have lacked a simple equivalent of our "forgive." The Attic law on
manslaughter uses ai5eia0ai (noun al'SeoK;, Dem. 21. 43, Arist. Ath. 57.
3) of the permission given by the victim's family to the guilty man to
return to Attica, and this is understandably translated "pardon," a term which
has a legal colouring and is somewhat closer to "concede" or "waive" than to
"forgive. "2 Pardon in accordance with legal requirements or social
convention and pressure can still leave a powerful residue of ill-will. The
Attic aiSeioBai seems to be a special application of the general sense of
the word, behaviour towards another person as if that other person had
precedence over oneself.
To infer from these lexical considerations that no one ever forgave
anybody in the Greek world until the late archaic period would be no more
intelligent than inferring, from the fact that English and German distinguish
between conscience and consciousness, whereas French and Italian do not,^
that the phenomenon of conscience is confined to certain parts of Europe.
The alternative inference, that early Greek poets chose (or happened) never to
portray anyone demanding or receiving forgiveness, is demolished by
observation: Achilles forgives Agamemnon in Iliad 19. Or is that the
imposition of modem categories on an alien text? The question must be
asked, but it need not be intimidating. To answer it, let us extricate
ourselves for a while from the history of words and get into the history of
experiences, which show much less diachronic change. We have all had the
experience of forgiving and being forgiven. What is going on in us when
we forgive, and what do we think is going on in other people when they
forgive us?
If you have harmed me, and later I have the capacity and the opportunity
to harm you but do not do so, then prima facie I have forgiven you. The
qualification "prima facie" is necessary, because there are many practical
reasons for abstaining from revenge on a given occasion, however
implacable my desire for it may be. Perhaps I see and relish the prospect of
an even better opportunity in the future; or, more often, abstention is a
means to some other end, e.g. maintaining good relations with a friend of
yours. The words "I forgive you" can be invested with an appearance of the
performative character of "I promise," but the performance is not
irrevocable; as the words constitute a statement about my feelings, to which
you do not have direct access, the statement may be false and shown to be
false by later events. It is true only if I no longer wish to harm you, no
2 Cf. C. E. von Erffa. AIAQI {= Philologus Suppl. 30. 2 [1937]) 105 f.; D. M.
MacDoweU. Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester 1963) 125 f.
' Cf. E. V. Kohak in the preface to his translation (Evanston 1974) of Paul Ricoeur, Le
volontaire et I'involontaire, xxxvi: "I have . . . rendered la conscience 'consciousness'
even in expressions where 'awareness' would have been usual, reserving the term
'conscience' for the few passages where this specific meaning is indicated by the context."
When lecturing in Italy on Greek moral values I had to discuss at some length with Italian
friends the circumlocutions needed to resolve the ambiguities of coscienza.
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matter how tempting and frequent the opportunities to do so. Then we can
speak of "true" or "genuine" forgiveness.
Remission of anger, of hatred, of the desire to hurt, call it what we
will, is the point at issue in the attempts of Agamemnon's envoys to move
Achilles in Iliad 9: 157 \i.ETaXkr\l,a\/ii xo^io, 255 f. ^eyaXTixopa 9-u|i6v
/ loxEvv ev atT|9eaoi' <piXo(ppoa-6vT| jap dp.eivcov, 496 f. 5d^aaov 0\)p.6v
p-eyav, o\)6i xi oe XP'H / vT|Xee<; TjTop e'xEvv, 675 xo^oq 6' ex' e'xei
^leyaXTixopa Gv^ov, 678 ovk eGeXei oPeooai xoXov. When events have
brought about Achilles' reconciliation with Agamemnon, he uses similar
terminology: 19. 67 f. eyco naxxa xo^v, ox)6e xi ^le xp^l / doKeXicoq
aiel )ievEaiv£|iev. Not surprisingly, in classical prose also forgiveness is
regularly contrasted with anger: Lys. 29. 5 (opyi^eoGai), PI. Euthd. 306c
(xaA-enaivEiv), Mnx. 244b (dyavaKXEiv), Phdr. 257a (opyn), 269b
(xaA,e7ia{v£iv), Rep. 366c (opyC^eoGai), E. Hipp. 1435 Ttaxepa \ir[
oxuyeiv and Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 38 ^ti xi . . . xaXEnawQr{c, xw 7caxp{,
compared above, come in this category.
Orestes, in his plea for help to Menelaus (E. Or. 642-79), "forgives"
him for his part in Uie sacrifice of Iphigenia; I'm not asking you, he says,
to kill Hermione in compensation; 6E'i ydp a' e|io\) Ttpdaoovxoq ©q
Tipdoaco xd vv)v / jiXeov (pepeaGai, Kd|xe Gx>yy\<£>^T\v e'xeiv (660 f.).
The words are harsh and wry. Orestes does not mean that he shares the
YV(b)j,T| which Menelaus had about the sacrifice at Aulis, nor are we to
imagine that he no longer resents it, only that it is pointless for the weak to
hope for revenge on the strong. The strangeness of the "reason" for his
"forgiveness," the bitterness with which the words are charged, prompt us to
ask what reasons the Greeks usually offer for forgiveness.
Most of the time, though not quite all the time, they are the same as
we give nowadays.** Ignorance and error; duress; poverty, alcohol, lust,
provocation; weaknesses believed to be characteristic of the old, or the
young, or the female; inherited temperament; loyalty to relations and
friends; the mortal propensity to err. I may forgive you out of pity, if great
misfortune befalls you before I have any opportunity for revenge; or you
may buy my forgiveness by payment of compensation. It is easy to be
cynical about compensation, but cynicism is misplaced. Your payment to
me is your loss, and in so far as loss is a form of suffering, I have my
revenge, my desire to harm you is satisfied, and I have no more desire to
harm you. At the same time, generosity in giving is very commonly a
manifestation of affection and equally commonly a cause of affection, so the
payment restores us to friendship.^
* For detailed examples see my Greek Popular Morality (Oxford 1974) 133-60.
* In 1988 a well-known singer received £1.25 million from a newspaper in an out-of-
court settlement of a libel action he had brought against it. He then said, "I don't bear The
Sun any malice," and a spokesman for the paper said, "We are delighted that The Sun and
Elton have become friends again."
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There are however some differences between ancient and modem grounds
for forgiveness. I cannot expect nowadays to be forgiven on the grounds
that my wrongdoing was fated, a plea with which Gorgias plays (B 1 1. 6) in
his defence of Helen; but it was never an entirely safe plea, for "My action
was fated" invites the retort (as Clytaemnestra discovers in A. Cho. 910 f.),
"So is my revenge." Nor can I plead that God compelled me to do wrong,
though I might (especially if I were an evangelist caught in an embarrassing
situation) say that I was tempted by the Devil, and I might even get some
credit for being considered by the Devil a worthwhile target. A Greek might
say that a god distorted his mind, destroying his better judgment (cf.
Agamemnon in //. 19. 86-94), but whether that is accepted as a reason for
forgiveness depends on whether his adversary has independent grounds for
forgiving.^ If he has none, he may suggest that the god's object was
actually to put the victim in a situation from which punishment would
inevitably follow, and that it is imprudent to thwart a god's purpose (cf.
And. 1. 113, Lys. 6. 22). Theseus was forgiven by Artemis not because
Aphrodite intervened directly in his mind (as she had done in Phaedra's), but
because she created a situation in which he did wrong dvGpcoTiivcoq.
Diminished responsibility on grounds of mental illness, an important issue
in modern thinking about crime and punishment, was not recognised in
Greek penal codes, partly because the illness could be regarded as evidence of
divine disfavour, and partly because Greek society generally treated risk to
the community as deserving precedence over unfairness to an individual.
The variation "revenge . . . punishment . . ." in the previous paragraph
is not unconscious, and it remains firmly within the field of xi^icapia,
ti|xcopeio0ai. There are occasions on which wrongdoing by an animal,
slave, child, employee or subordinate incurs infliction of suffering without
incurring at the same time the anger, hatred or even ill-will of the owner or
superior who inflicts it; the suffering is treated as an ingredient of training
and education and as a regrettable necessity for the deterrence of others."^ The
Greeks denoted that by KoXd^eiv, Kohxaiq, and Arist. Rhet. 1269bl2-14
defines KoXaoic, as inflicted xox> jidoxovToq eveKa, Ti|xcopia as xo\>
7ioio\)vxo<; EVEKa. Clement of Alexandria adopts the Aristotelian
distinction in Paed. 1. 8 (p. 131. 8) and in asserting {Str. 7. 16 [p. 72. 20])
that God KoXd^Ei but does not TijicopeiaGai (a proposition not easily
defended in an eschatological context). Yet he slips into looser usage in Str.
7. 12 (p. 74. 6) when he refers to the tifitopia of malefactors, and 7. 10 (p.
41. 18) KoXdoEcoq Kttl TifitopCaq aTidariq, aq ek twv d|j.apTrmdTcov
Ei<; naiSEiav utio^ievo^ev otoxripiov. Plato's Protagoras (Prt. 324a-c)
appears at first sight to be drawing a clear distinction between ^Exd Xoyov
^ See further my Greek and the Greeks (Oxford 1987) 88. 138 f.
^ The legendary flogging pedagogues who said "This hurts me more than it hurts you" are
regarded with contempt because what they said was sometimes false; that does not preclude
the possibility that it was sometimes true.
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KoXd^Eiv, infliction of suffering for the purpose of making the sufferer
behave better in future, and (oonep Gripiov dXoYiaT(0(; xiixcopeioGai,
infliction tovtox) evEKa, oxi tidiKTiaev. We might think that he is
distinguishing between two genera of action by the criterion of intention.*
He continues, however: "This opinion is held by all those who
xi^icopovvTai, whether in a private or a public capacity. All people
Tincopottvxai Kal KoXd^ovxai^ those whom they think guilty of
wrongdoing, and your fellow-citizens, the Athenians, do it as much as
anyone." The first part of this statement, "This opinion . . . capacity" is
untrue, as we know from our own experience, but the statement as a whole
shows that Protagoras's distinction is between two species of the genus
Ti|i(op{a, one ^lexd Xoyo-u and the other aXoyioioc,. Even that distinction
does not count for much in the courts; the speaker of Lys. 6, who demands
the death penalty for Andocides, urges the jury in 13 and 42-44 to
KoXd^Eiv wrongdoers, and in 15, 18, 53 to xi|i.topEio9ai them. Modem
usage, except on the plane of theory, is hardly more inclined to
distinguish,'^ and the reason for that is simple enough: From the receiving
end, the distinction is not apparent. If I am sentenced to ten years in jail,
how can it matter to me whether it is called "correction" or "revenge"? I
may be told that I am "paying my debt to society," but a more concise term
is avoided. The reason for its avoidance leads us directly to what is by far
the most important difference between Greek and modem attitudes to
forgiveness, the powerful role played in our moral thinking by the
uncompromising command of Christ to forgive (Mt 18. 22) and his
prohibition of retaliation (Mt 5. 38^7). Acknowledgement of religious
duty causes Christian societies, whatever suffering they inflict on
wrongdoers, to deny that it is revenge. Realisation that no society will last
very long if it continues to forgive wrongdoing enables it to believe that
KoXaoic, and dcpEoiq can somehow exist Kaxd xa-uxov Kal npbq xat)x6v
djia. In individual cases, religious duty coupled with an un-hellenic belief
in a great moral gulf between God and humanity can induce someone whose
daughter has been killed by gunmen to say, "I forgive them, because I know
that I too have need of forgiveness."
Greek gods do not command us to forgive on an extravagant scale, if at
all. They themselves are not conspicuously forgiving, and we have some
allusions to particular cases in which the criteria they apply to forgiveness
are at best human, and at worst'' heroic. The most straightforward case is
* For a logical analysis of Protagoras's argument see C. C. W. Taylor's translation and
commenury (Oxford 1976) 90-96.
' The switch from the active voice (b2, b7) to the middle is unexpected; it is caused, I
think, by the introduction of the public domain (Simcaia) into the context, for the state
KoXd^ei but 6 YpoKpoM-evo<; KoXa^etai.
'° I have heard a vengeful husband say, "I want her to suffer. I want to punish her."
^' Cf. B. M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964) 19-25 on
the uncompromising disposition of the Sophoclean hero.
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that of Pheretime, queen of Cyrene, who impaled round the walls of Barce
those of its citizens whom she held most responsible for her son's murder,
and for good measure cut off their wives' breasts and nailed the breasts too
to the walls. Some time later she died of a horrible illness, so
demonstrating, says Herodotus (4. 205) ax; apa dvGptoTioiai al Xit|v
Tl^(op{al npbq GeSv £7t{99ovoi yivovxai. If she had been more
discriminating in her vengeance, seasoning it with clemency (as Xenophon's
Cyrus would have done) and abstaining from barbarous torture and offensive
display, the gods would not have been moved to hostiUty. They reacted as
humans do, and had the power to give expression to their reaction.
The second case, that of Herakles' murder of Iphitus, is more subtle.
According to the speech of Lichas in Soph, Tr. 248-90, Iphitus's father
Eurytus had grossly insulted Herakles; on a later occasion, therefore,
Herakles distracted Uie attention of Iphitus when they were on top of a high
tower, and pushed him over the edge. For this Zeus sentenced Herakles to a
year's servitude under Omphale; "If," says Lichas (278-80) "he had requited
Iphitus openly, Zeus would have forgiven him (Zetx; xav a-uvEyvco) his
just victory (t,h\ diKr\ xevpo\)^ev(p), for the gods too have no love of
hybris." To a modem scholar, killing a young man because one has been
treated hybristically by his father seems the act of a maniac; but there are
cultures and sub-cultures today (e.g. in Lebanon, to say nothing of points
much further west) in which it would be de rigueur, a salutary thought when
we are tempted to contrast "ancient" and "modem" without qualification.
Herakles is one of those tragic characters who do nothing by halves, and the
gods of tragedy, while sharing human distaste for treacherous killing, are
prepared to tolerate face-to-face revenge on a monstrous scale. •
Yet Herakles would not have fared well before an Athenian jury.^^
There is abundant evidence that in the fourth century magnanimity,
forgiveness, "niceness," very commonly designated enielKeia, were
admired and respected, and they were a product of civilised society to which
religious doctrine does not appear to have made any significant contribution.
Arist. EN 1143al9-24 associates auyyvcoiioviKog and iniziKr\q very
closely. The Athenian speaker in PI. Lg. 757e is notably uncomfortable
about the necessary conflict between to eTtieiKeq Kai ovyyvcofiov and
strict justice, and Arist. EN 1137a31-38a3 wrestles with their interrelation,
coming to the agreeable conclusion that eTiieiKeia is 6iKaioavvTi xiq. I
have explored enieiKeia elsewhere,^ ^ and draw attention now to two words,
etymologically related to each other, one common and one rare, which are
sometimes used with connotations of magnanimity: The common word is
Yevvaio(;, the rarer word Yevvd6aq, which is confined to Aristophanes,
'^ Nor would Antigone, confronted by a prosecutor like Lycurgus.
" Greek Popular Morality 61-63. 191.
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two passages of Plato and one of Aristotle.^'* Given their derivation from
yevva, they might have been used to imply pride, haughtiness and
arrogance, but that is just what they do not imply, and this fact tells us
much about Athenian attitudes to forgiveness.
The long-dead general Myronides is admiringly called yewdSag in Ar.
Ec. 304, but we do not know for what virtues, other than swift and resolute
military action, he was remembered in tradition; in Ach. 1230 the victorious
Dikaiopolis is hailed as © yzwaha; and one of the slaves in Eq. 240 f.
prevents the Sausage-seller from running away in panic by saying ©
Yevvd5a / aXXavtoncoXa, \iy\ npoSfix; xd Tipdy^axa. Nothing so far
to associate the word with magnanimity, but Frogs enlarges the field. In
179, when Xanthias has offered to carry all the luggage if no one else can be
found to do so, Dionysus compliments him by saying xptiaToq^^ el Kal
YEwdSaq, and Xanthias earns Uie same compliment from the Janitor (640
"You really are yevvaSaq dvrip!") when he displays a willingness to
submit to pain in the interests of fair play. 738^2, the opening of the
conversation between Xanthias and the slave of Pluto, throws fresh light on
the connotations of the word. "Your master," says the slave admiringly, "is
7evvd6a<; dvTjp!" "Of course he is," says Xanthias, "he doesn't know how
to do anything but drink and screw." Pluto's slave persists: "Fancy his not
beating you up when it was proved that you'd been claiming to be the
master, when you were a slave!" The slave calls Dionysus yzwahac,
because he forgave Xanthias; Xanthias agrees, because, in his view,
Dionysus's horizon is confined to drink and women, so naturally he's easy-
going. The connotation "easy-going" and therefore "magnanimous" suits
PI. Phdr. 243c, where yevvd^aq is coupled with npaoc, (which in turn is
coupled with evkoXoc; in Hp. Mi. 364d), and Arist. EN 1100b32, on the
man who endures great misfortunes eukoXcoc;, not through insensivity but
because he is yevvdSaq Kal ^eyaX6\j/\)xo<;. The last occurrence of
yEvvd6a(; in Frogs is at 997, where the chorus appeals to Aeschylus to
keep his temper in arguing against Euripides: aXV onax; w yEvvd5a / \iy\
7ip6(; opyfiv dvTiX£^Ei<;. Just as w y£vvd6a addressed to the fleeing
Sausage-seller was not an expression of a judgment on his character but an
attempt to give him a certain character by addressing him as if he akeady
possessed it—cf. "O most merciful king!" and the like, addressed to a
^* For the history of ftwabac, and its hypothetical prehistory see G. Bjorck, Das Alpha
Impurum und die tragische Kunstsprache (Uppsala 1950) 51-54. LSJ boldly labels it
"Dtoric," but it is not yet attested in any non-Attic text.
^^ XptioToq is often translated (even by people who should know better) "useful," for
which the Greek is xpTioinoq; xpTlo'c6<; is in fact the most general Atdc word for "good,"
and the translation "useful" is appropriate only in such phrases as xpryozix 6i5daKeiv,
XprioTci napaiveiv, because a useful lesson or useful advice is the same as a good lesson
or good advice. The translation of xpTiaroq as "noble" is also inappropriate except when a
writer loyal to the upper class treats that class as if it had a monopoly of goodness. On the
wide scope of xpiiotoc; see my The Greeks and their Legacy (Oxford 1988) 10 f.
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tyrant—so the chorus in Frogs hopes to induce in Aeschylus the behaviour
of a yevvdSac; dvTjp, That fits the only instance of w yzwahct in Plato,
Chrm. 155d. Socrates is telling Critias of his encounter with the young and
dazzlingly beautiful Charmides: "And then, © yzvv6.hcL, I saw inside his
himation, and I was all afire, head over heels . . ." This is just the sort of
context in which speakers elsewhere in Plato ask for forgiveness, e.g.
Euthd. 286e "My question may be rather a bore, aXkh ovyyiyvtoGKe"; cf.
Smp. 218b "That's why I'll tell you the whole story; you'll forgive what I
did then and what I'm saying now." Socrates is afraid that his candid
confession of erotic sensibility will embarrass Critias, and may bore him.
revvaio(; too, a term of positive evaluation which requires a very wide
range of translations to cover all the contexts in which we find it, may have
the connotation "easy-going," "magnanimous," "laid-back," as it does in PI.
Rep. 558c, a passage of caustic irony about the "marvellously agreeable"
way in which a democratic state is run. Socrates refers to its g-oyyvcouti
Kal oiL)5 ' oTiaxjxiow op-iKpoXxyyia ("total dismissal of mere details") and its
readiness to take on trust anyone in politics who asserts his goodwill to the
city. Glaucon, going along with the irony, agrees: Tidvu y', Ecpri,
yevvaia.
This completes a full circle and brings us back to Hippolytus.
Artemis' s recommendation that he should not "hate his father" is hardly
needed, because Hippolytus has already made his freedom from hatred
sufficiently clear in addressing Theseus as hxxsxaljaj;, . . . Tfia6e cru)j.(popa(;^^
(1407) and in saying that he mourns for his father more than for himself
(1409). After Artemis's exhortation, he takes the first step towards formal
forgiveness, X-oco 6e veTKO(; Tiaxpl (1442), but in adding that he does this at
Artemis's behest he still leaves unresolved the issue which, it seems, most
troubles Theseus at this moment. Attic law (Dem. 37. 59) provided that if
the victim of homicide forgave (dcpievai) the killer, there was no pollution,
no angry ghost to appease, and therefore no punishment. Hippolytus makes
the formal declaration which gives effect to this provision, oe Tot)5'
£A.£\)0epa> (p6vo\) (1449). Theseus is incredulous (1450 ti (pfiq; d^iriq
di\iaLx6c, ^i' eXevGepov;), and Hippolytus puts his declaration beyond
question by calling on Artemis to witness it (1451). Then Theseus
exclaims (1452) ox; yzvvaXoc, eK9aivTi naxpi.
Artemis is very far from issuing a divine injunction equivalent to
"Bless them that curse you"; she is sorting out a situation in a heroic family
in a way which will not conflict significantly with the existing corpus of
Attic myth about Theseus. For the purpose, she treats Theseus's fatal
cursing of Hippolytus as it if were (povoq dKovaioq (which it is not, 887-
90). Tigranes' tutor chooses to treat the king's sentence too as if it were
^* A defendant (or his sympathisers) may refer to a misdeed of his own as a m)H<popd. If
a prosecutor called it that, he would be as good as conceding the case; cf. D. M.
MacDowell's edition of Andocides, On the Mysteries (Oxford 1962) 126.
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dcKovoioq (which, again, it is not). Hippolytus and the tutor—and by
implication Tigranes himself, whom we have previously heard pleading for
his father's life and moving Cyrus to forgiveness of rebellion {Cyr. 3. 1. 7-
37)—earn praise by forgiving a murderous (and unforgiving) injustice.
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